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1 Introduction 
 
The Russian Federation played a key role in enabling the Kyoto Protocol (KP) to enter into 
force. Although the country could benefit a lot from the Protocol itself, it ratified only after 
having secured enough additional political incentives from abroad, notably from the European 
Union. This strenuous process will first be touched upon. Next, the quantitative obligations 
arising from the KP for Russia will be discussed, and the potential advantages for Russia of 
some of the Kyoto mechanisms. After that, the general modalities of actually implementating 
the KP in Russia and the specific legislation with regard to Joint Implementation (JI) adopted 
at the end of May 2007 will be turned to. Whether the latter legislation will enable a timely 
start of JI projects in Russia will be the focus point of the last-but-one part of this chapter. In 
the final part, some concluding remarks are presented, notably on the prospects of Russia 
committing itself to a meaningful post-2012 regime. 
 
 
2 From signing to ratification 
 
On 16 February 2007 it was two years since the coming into force of the Kyoto protocol to 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Adopted on 11 December 
1997, the Protocol was the first international agreement with quantitative obligations for some 
of its parties to limit and reduce emissions of greenhouse gases by amounts averaging 5.2 
percent by 2008-2012. By June 2007, 173 countries are party to the Protocol, including one 
regional organization, the European Community. 
The fact that the Kyoto Protocol could enter into force depended on the Russian Federation, in 
the end. The reason for this was that Article 25 of the Protocol made its entry into force 
dependent on ratification by not less than 55 Parties to the UNFCCC, incorporating Annex I 
Parties accounting in total for at least 55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 
1990 of these Annex I Parties. As the USA (responsible for 36.1 % of emissions by Annex I 
countries) decided not to ratify, crossing the threshold depended on Russia, which represented 
17.4% of the Annex I countries‟ emissions.3 At first, this did not seem to be a problem. In 
2001, Russia and the EC anounced that they would work together with a view to early 
ratification and entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol.
4
 The EC approved the Protocol on 31 
May 2002, but Russia needed more time. At the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in September 2002, Russia‟s then Prime-Minister Kashyanov did state that 
„ratification will occur in the very near future.‟ At the same venue, Deputy Minister 
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Mukhamed Tsikanov of the Economic Development and Trade Ministry indicated that there 
was a risk that Russia would not ratify because „we don‟t have the economic stimulus, the 
economic interest in the Kyoto Protocol.‟ He did add that, for the moment, the plan in 
Moscow was still to ratify. By March 2003, this had still not occurred, prompting a visit by 
EC Environment Commissioner Margot Wallström and the Greek and Italian Environment 
Ministers to encourage Russia to follow through on its pledges. „The world is waiting for 
Russia to demonstrate that it is ready and willing to become a major player in the multilateral 
efforts to combat climate change,‟ Ms Wallström stated ahead of her visit to Moscow.5 
Between 29 September and 3 October 2003, the World Conference on Climate Change took 
place in Moscow. It was intended to be the first meeting of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol, 
but since Russia still had not ratified, this was not possible. President Putin‟s opening speech 
made clear that no exact date was set for Russian ratification. „Russia is being actively called 
on to ratify the Kyoto protocol as soon as possible. I am certain that these appeals will also be 
heard many times at your meeting. I want to say that the Government of the Russian 
Federation is carefully examining and studying this issue, studying the entire range of 
complex problems connected with this‟, Putin said. „A decision will be made after this work is 
finished. And, of course, it will be made in accordance with the national interests of the 
Russian Federation.‟ Joke Waller-Hunter, the executive secretary of the UNFCCC, was frank 
in expressing her disappointment. „We had hoped that [President Putin] would have been 
somewhat more specific on the date when he would expect the Russian ratification to take 
place,‟ she said. „Last year in Johannesburg, the [Russian] prime minister announced Russia 
would ratify the Kyoto Protocol in the nearest future, and we had hoped the nearest future had 
come today and that we would have a clear signal.‟6  
The Conference itself definitely examined the issue of climate change and a very wide range 
of problems linked to it, but consensus on the benefits of Russia‟s ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol was not reached. The opponents of Kyoto brought forward fierce arguments. Andrei 
Illarionov, economic adviser to President Putin, warned for instance that „the Kyoto Protocol 
will stymie economic growth; it will doom Russia to poverty, weakness and backwardness‟, 
claiming that each percentage point of GDP growth is accompanied by a 2 per cent growth in 
CO2 emissions.
7
 He also claimed that the EU legislation would stand in the way of buying any 
emission credits from Russia.
8
 Later on, Illarionov even went as far as comparing the Kyoto 
Protocol regime to Auschwitz.
9
 
In all likelihood, the extremely negative stance towards Kyoto was part of a strategy to gain 
concessions from the EC in negotiations on Russia‟s WTO accession, as Commissioner 
Verheugen explained in a hearing in German Parliament.
10
 At the EU-Russia summit on 21 
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May 2004, President Putin announced that “[t]he European Union has made some concessions 
on some points during the negotiations on the WTO. This will inevitably have an impact on 
our positive attitude to the Kyoto process. We will speed up Russia‟s movement towards 
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol.” Indeed, President Putin decided in favour of the Protocol in 
September 2004, along with the Russian cabinet. As anticipated after this, ratification by the 
State Duma (22 October 2004) and Federation Council (lower and upper house of parliament) 
did not encounter any obstacles.
11
 On 4 November 2004 the Protocol was approved by 
President Putin and Russia officially notified the United Nations of its ratification on 18 
November 2004. In Russia itself, the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was described as a 
necessity in exchange for the EC's support to the Russia's accession to the WTO.
12
 Ninety 
days after Russia‟s ratification the Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005.  
 
 
3 Russia’s obligations and prospects under the KP 
 
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol takes 1990 levels of emissions as its basis. On the average, the 
developed (Annex I) countries to the KP have agreed to ensure a cut in greenhouse-gas 
emissions of at least 5% from 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008-2012. Individual 
country targets range between -8% and +10%. Russia has been allowed to return its enissions 
to its 1990 levels. Since 1990, the economies of most countries in the former Soviet Union 
have collapsed, as have their greenhouse gas emissions. This also holds true for Russia. In 
1999, according to Russia‟s own 2002 inventory report to the UNFCCC, its emissions were 
38% below 1990 levels. In its 2006 inventory report, Russia indicated that although its CO2 
emissions grew 11% between 1999 and 2004, they were still 30% below the 1990 levels.  
Although Russia‟s economy is expected to continue growing, the country does not foresee 
any problems in meeting its quantitative targets under the Kyoto Protocol for the 2008-2012 
commitment period.
13
 In this respect, it is important to underline how far Illarionov was 
beside the truth when proclaiming that each percentage point of Russia‟s GDP growth would 
be accompanied by 2% growth in CO2 emissions. In reality, Russia‟s recovering economy 
shows that GDP growth with 30% from 1998 to 2003 was not accompanied by 60% growth in 
CO2 emissions, but rather by a rate well below the GDP growth rate.
14
 This partial decoupling 
of GDP and carbon emissions since 1998 shows that energy efficiency in Russia is increasing, 
in line with the Russian Energy Strategy.
15
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The latest forecast of Russia is that its CO2 emissions will still be some 25% below the 1990 
levels by the end of 2012, in spite of further economic growth.
16
 This means that in all 
probability, Russia will have no problems in meeting its quantitative obligations under the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
As for the post-2012 period, for which new obligations are still to be agreed upon, Russian 
forescasts predict that by the year 2020, CO2 emissions will still be 10 to 20% below 1990 
levels.
17
  
An interesting point that was made in favour of a vigorous Russian energy-efficiency policy is 
the potential for energy exports. Russia‟s economic growth over the last years was to a 
considerable extend due to its oil and gas export. One commentator, Igor Bashmakov of 
CENEf (Centre for Energy Efficiency), even claims that if Russia would double its GDP (as is 
the goal set by President Putin) without improvements to its energy intensity levels, it would 
lose its capacity to export oil and gas already by the year 2010.
18
 In other words: if Russia 
wants to keep up its economic growth, this will depend on energy exports and these are only 
possible if energy-efficiency increases.   
Whether or not Russia will be able to benefit from the Kyoto Protocol is doubted by some,
19
 
but most agree that joining Kyoto offers valuable options for Russia,
20
 notably because its 
industry and electricity production suffer from major energy inefficiencies that could be dealt 
with via Joint Implementation projects. There is a large potential for improving energy 
efficiency in Russia,
21
 with energy use per unit of GDP being much greater than in the EU.
22
 
Besides JI, to which we will return below, another option under the KP is the selling of 
assigned amounts units (AAUs). The KP enables countries like Russia with a surplus to sell 
parts of this surplus to other Annex 1 Parties. These unused assigned amounts are often 
referred to as „hot air‟ because purchases would not yield environmental benefits. For Russia, 
however, the surpluses are a result of the humiliating economic decline and restructuring 
process, and benefits from sales of these surpluses are probably regarded more as 
compensation than as a „windfall‟.23 Anyway, Russia‟s significant surplus of emission quotas 
can be sold to other countries with targets when international emissions trading starts. The 
amount of money that Russia could earn by selling emission credits under the Kyoto Protocol 
will depend on the total amount of quotas it decides to sell and the market price of such 
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quotas. Without the USA participating, demand and thus prices are probably going to be less 
than first anticipated. Potential buyers of emission credits from Russia are the Canada, Japan 
and the EU. Russia itself introduced the concept of Green Investment Scheme (GIS) at COP-6 
in December 2000. With such a GIS in place, revenues from the sale of surplus allowances 
would be earmarked for environmentally related purposes. The idea was not worked out 
further pending the period in which Russia was dragging its feet in ratifying the KP, but could 
be revived to accommodate concerns about „hot air‟ trading. 
As already indicated above, Russia could also invite other countries with emission targets to 
carry out emission reductions projects in Russia from which emission credits could be sold. 
Such Joint Implementation (JI) projects would enable Russian industry, especially in the 
energy sector, to become more efficient and less pollution-intensive. The projects could also 
help industry and municipalities to modernise and acquire new technology, for example in the 
district heating sector.
24
 Before JI projects can start in Russia, a number of institutional 
requirements set out in the KP need to be met. 
 
 
4 The adoption of general implementation measures 
 
Countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol must create institutional arrangements for 
implementation. In order to prepare for the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol 
(2008-2012), after its ratification in November 2004, Russia first of all adopted a National 
Action Plan on the Kyoto Protocol Implementation in March 2005.
25
 The plan sets out the 
distribution of responsibilities among 15 Federal governmental bodies (Ministries and 
Agencies) with regard to the realization of the KP in Russia (by mentioning the lead body and 
those further involved) and a (overly optimistic) timepath by which further action is to be 
taken (for instance: adopting JI procedures by mid-2005). In May of the same year, an Inter-
Agency Commission on the Kyoto Protocol was established (lead by dept. Minister A. 
Sharonov of MEDT).
26
 This Commission upgraded the aforementioned Action Plan in July 
and October 2005. The MEDT came out as the responsible ministry coordinating Russia‟s 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Issues that were dealt with since then include: 
- A national system of emissions estimation (национальная система оценки выбросов 
парниковых газов) ex Art. № 5 Kyoto protocol; established by Government Decree 
(01.03.2006 № 278-р).27Roshydromet (the Russian HydroMeteorological organisation) is 
responsible for carrying it out. 
- A National Inventory of emissions and removals (национальный кадастр выбросов и 
абсорбции) ex Art. № 7 Kyoto protocol; established by Roshydromet Order (30.06.2006 No. 
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 On the basis of this document the National Inventory Report on 1990-2004 emissions 
was made.
29
 
- The Fourth National Communication under the UNFCCC (2006).
30
 
- The Report on progress in implementation of the Kyoto protocol (prepared by Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade).
31
 
- The Report on fixed quantities.
32
 
- Organization administrating the Russian register of CO2 – “Federal centre of geoecological 
systems”; Government decree of 15.12.2006 No. 1741-p33 on creation of an organization-
administrator of Russian cadastre of carbon emissions. 
In many respects, the reporting by Russia up until the Third National Communication was 
judged to be insufficient and not in accordance with prescribed formats, although progress 
was visible over the years. Hopefully, the Fourth National Communication, and the National 
Inventory Report for that matter, will continue to be more precise than the previous reports. 
 
 
5 The Joined Implementation regime 
 
Where JI is concerned, two options are available for the Parties to the KP: Track 1 (full 
eligibility) and Track 2 (partial eligibility). Russia opted for the second way, which implies 
among other things that JI projects will need to be verified by an Accredited Independent 
Entity (AIE), accredited by the JI Supervisory Committee (JI SC). For quite some time, 
Russian projects had been seeking approval from the Russian administration. On 28 May 
2007, the long awaited Decree on JI in Russia was finally adopted (2 years later than the 
Russian Action Plan had set out).
34
 The main points of this decree can be summarized as 
following: 
 The Russian JI Coordinating Centre responsible of preparation of JI projects approval 
is based at the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (MEDT); 
 The list of projects chosen by the MEDT is sent to the Government where it is getting 
final approval in consultation with the Federal executive bodies (governing given 
activities); 
 The Russian Government can dismiss approved projects for reasons such as missing 
deadlines in reporting to the Coordination Centre and discontinuation of the 
activities of a private entrepreneur.  
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изменении климата (Decree of 28 May 2007 N 332 on the regime of approval and control of the operation of 
projects, carried out in accordance with Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC). 
Pursuing this decree, the Rules on approval and assessment of JI project realization No. 
0796, were adopted on 30 May 2007.35  These include the following provisions: 
 The deponent deposits a project concept, project documentation and project 
passport with the coordinating centre (the Ministry); The documents shall be 
prepared according to the templates available on the website of the coordinating 
centre and signed by the deponent; 
 The concept is approved by the commission set up by the coordinating centre, 
which also chooses independent expert organizations using the criteria given in Art. 
6 of the Kyoto Protocol. The final list of expert organizations shall be available on 
website of the coordinating centre; 
 Foreign deponents shall deposit the documents in the language of the respective 
country, with notarized translation in Russian. 
 It is possible to conclude an international agreement on JI project implementation 
with a foreign counterpart. 
 Projects realization shall not take place before January 1, 2008 or after December 31, 
2012; 
 It takes 10 working days for the coordination centre to register the project concept 
deposition, 30 days for respective Federal body to work the concept out and give a 
positive or negative conclusion on it, and 10 working days for the Government to 
give the final approval to the list of JI projects. 
 The JI projects realization is assessed by a designated body (differs according to 
project`s implementation sector), which on certain grounds (wrong project 
implementation) can come up with suggestion to the coordination centre on 
project´s termination.  
 The reporting period on the project is one calendar year. 
 The disputes related to project realization are settled by means of negotiations 
within 6 month; otherwise sides can go to court or arbitrary court in accordance 
with the legislation and international obligations of Russian Federation. 
Not everything is ready yet for JI projects in Russia. The MEDT together with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs will by 1 September 2007 need to come up with the template of international 
agreement between the Government of Russian Federation and foreign governments on 
project realization. Futhermore, standards on project efficiency will need to be adopted for 
project approval. The MEDT could have these ready by the end of the summer of 2007. Also, 
the list of independent experts needs to be made available. Thus, it remains unclear when 
exactly JI projects can go ahead in Russia.  Also, the decree and rules described above still 
leave several questions unanswered, notably which other organizations will be involved, 
and thus a clear and transparent approval system for JI projects is still lacking.  Meanwhile, 
that the timeframe for JI projects becomes really urgent as the start of the first commitment 
period (1 January 2008) is approaching and finalization of the rules and guidelines with 
regard to JI procedures will probably take up the rest of the summer of 2007, at least. At any 
rate, the die is cast. As so often in Russia, chances are that somehow, things will work out. 
 
 
6 Concluding remarks 
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Russia took its time before ratifying the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. After doing so in November 
2004, an intensive debate on the modalities of implementation started. In March 2005, a 
National Action Plan on the Kyoto Protocol Implementation was adopted, while in May of the 
same year an Inter-Agency Commission on the Kyoto Protocol was established. Only at the 
end of May 2007, the first legislation with regard to JI was adopted. This means that the 
country‟s first emission reduction projects could soon be submitted to the UNFCCC JI 
approval process. The UNFCCC Secretariat estimates that these first emission reduction 
projects in Russia could reduce emissions of greenhouse gases by more than 65 million tonnes 
of CO2-equivalent over the five years from 2008 – i.e. approximately the emissions of 
Sweden during one year.
36
 The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade will be taking 
the lead in assessing, controlling and implementing the JI projects.  
Hopefully, the implementation of the Protocol will turn out to be profitable for Russia. That 
would certainly contribute to a more positive stance of the country to a post-2012 regime than 
the views that were being expressed so far.  
For a start, at a large conference on Climate Change in St. Petersburg held at the end of May 
2007, the only state official attending, Federation Council Speaker Sergej Mironov, claimed 
in his opening speech that global warming does not exist and that in fact, the world is getting 
cooler. At the same conference, a government energy adviser warned that the KP would 
threaten the independence of the Russian oil and gas industry.
 37
 More importantly, at the G8 
Summit of Heiligendamm at the start of June 2007, Russia – together with the USA - refused 
to agree on firm post-2012 commitments. Instead, Russia and the USA only accepted to 
“consider seriously” to join the other G8 group members in their efforts in combating climate 
change by cutting greenhouse gas emissions 50 percent by 2050.
38
 Getting Russia on board of 
a meaningful post-2012 regime will thus be among the many challenges awaiting the 
European Union and others. Hopefully, the lessons that can be learned from Russia‟s 
ratification process will be taken at heart. 
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